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0. Introduction 
 
 Viewing social identities as intersectional has become central to understanding 
how various dimensions of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability status, and class 
interact to yield more complex forms of discrimination than those suffered by persons 
who fall under only one category. In this paper I develop a metaphysics of 
intersectionality, and thereby advance understanding of the concept beyond metaphor. As 
a descriptive rather than revisionary project, the aim is to reflect actual definitions of 
intersectionality on offer. The result will be a richer understanding of the interlevel and 
intralevel relationships involved in intersectionality.  
Here is the plan. In Section 1, I lay out the conceptual basics of intersectionality 
and narrow the target explanandum. I survey commonly used metaphors deployed in 
service of defining intersectionality, and show why these metaphors are metaphysically 
significant. In Section 2, I draw on debates about diachronic composition to yield results 
for the metaphysics of intersectionality. I sketch multiple metaphysical formulations of its 
central tenet of inseparability of social categories, and show the advantages of one such 
conception over another. In Section 3, I propose and defend the idea that intersectionality 
is best understood as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the intersectional category 
over its constituents, on par with grounding claims in contemporary analytic metaphysics.  
 
1. Intersectionality: The Basics 
 The basic idea of intersectionality is that forms of oppression stemming from 
membership in multiple social categories such as “black” and “woman” intersect and 
thereby create new forms of oppression that are causally, modally, and relationally 
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different from the constituent forms of oppression merely added together. Analyzing 
oppression stemming from black womanhood, for example, is not just a matter of 
analyzing blackness and analyzing womanhood. Similarly with other finer-grained 
categories like “gay Hispanic male”, “disabled Jewish woman”, and so on. Intersectional 
identities have at least two and indefinitely many constituent categories. Gender, 
biological sex, race, sexual orientation, disability status, and socioeconomic class are 
canonical constituents of intersectional identities. 
  In the literature, “intersectionality” refers to a few different phenomena. 
Sometimes it refers to members of intersectional social categories, like black women. 
Sometimes it refers to forms of oppression faced by members of such categories, for 
example, those forms of discrimination faced by black women that are faced neither by 
women alone nor by black people alone. Intersectionality sometimes refers to a type or 
token of experience faced by members of such categories, as in experiences had by black 
women that are not entirely explicable by appeal to being black or to being a woman. 
There is a causal theory of intersectionality, according to which intersecting systems of 
power produce effects on groups or individuals that would not be produced if the 
dimensions did not intersect.2 And intersectionality sometimes refers to a method of 
theorizing from or about a specific viewpoint, as when one is theorizing from the 
perspective of a disabled Jewish woman.  
 I will assume that all of the above phenomena are worthy bearers of the label, but 
I will largely focus on intersectional identity categories as the target explanandum. I will 
not delve into detail about what I take categories to be, but I will assume for the sake of 
this paper that they are metaphysically substantive in the sense that they are more than 
mere collections of social classifications: they are the metaphysical umbrella under which 
oppressed groups fall, whether singly or multiply.3 I will not take a stand on some 
substantive issues about the metaphysics of sex, gender, and race, though answers to 
those questions ultimately intersect with a metaphysics of intersectionality.4 Though there 
is significant controversy over both the usefulness of intersectionality and who is allowed 
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to adopt it as a theoretical construct,5 I will assume that it is useful as a theoretical tool 
and that it is widely available to be discussed by those who wish to understand any 
system of interlocking social oppression. 
 Though the intersectionality literature mostly focuses on intersectional minority 
identities and unique dimensions of oppression faced by such minorities, it is worth 
noting that all identities are to some extent intersectional in a broad sense of the term.  
Just as there are distinctive forms of oppression for intersectional minority identities, 
there are distinctive forms of privilege for non-minority ones. A white upper-class man, 
for example, is privileged in ways not entirely reducible to the joint features of being 
white, being a man, and being upper class. Philosophical interest in intersectionality as a 
tool, therefore, is not restricted to those seeking to understand minority identities. On one 
way of thinking about it, we are all intersectional to some degree or other.6 I will, 
however, restrict my focus to intersectional categories as they relate to forms of 
interlocking systemic oppression, rather than intersectional categories full stop. 
 Now onto canonical accounts of intersectionality. Often described and defined 
metaphorically, the term originates in Crenshaw’s “intersecting traffic” comparison7:  
 “Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four 
 directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one 
 direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it 
 can be caused by cars traveling from any number of  directions and, sometimes, 
 from all of them. Similarly if a black woman is harmed because she is in the 
 intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination 
 [or both].” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 149).  
Crenshaw’s metaphor evokes a Venn diagram-like picture of social categories, according 
to which causal results of membership in multiple social categories can stem from one 
category, the other category, or both categories combined. 
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 Recent literature has refined the concept of intersectionality in order to 
incorporate the inseparability of identity categories. Whereas non-intersectional 
approaches treat these aspects of identity as merely additive—what it is like to be a black 
woman can be neatly broken down into what it is like to be both of those constituents—
contemporary intersectional approaches treat these aspects as intimately attached. What it 
is like to be a black woman cannot be understood exclusively through appeal to the 
separate identity markers mashed together. Thus Garry’s (2011) preferred metaphor for 
intersectionality attempts to capture the complex ways in which dimensions of oppression 
mix, rather than simply being added together: 
“[We] can replace vehicles with liquids to show the  ways in which some 
oppressions or privileges seem to blend or fuse with others. Different liquids—
milk, coffee, nail polish, olive oil, beet borscht, paint in several colors—run down 
from different places at different altitudes into roundabouts. Some of the liquids 
run together, some are marbled with others, and some stay more separate unless 
whipped together. For me, this image captures intersectionality better than many 
others, but it still cannot capture agency well.” 
Leaning on metaphor as well, Haslanger writes that “the intersection of race and gender 
has an effect similar to overlapping different colored gels on a theater light” (2014, p. 
116), as well as invoking inseparability of social categories as central to intersectionality:  
 “Experience is intersectional when it is the result of being socially positioned in 
 multiple categories at once. Because I am socially positioned simultaneously as 
 White, able-bodied, affluent, and as a woman, my experience of being a woman is 
 inflected by the ways that these other social positions affect me. There are many 
 who have argued that the experience of being a woman (or being White, or 
 affluent) cannot be separated from the experience of the other social positions, 
 because experience is not ‘‘additive’’ in the way that would be required (e.g., 
 Spelman 1988).” 
 
Like Garry’s metaphor, Haslanger’s comparison suggests a complex, non-additive, 
intermingling metaphysical relationship between different aspects of social identity. Both 
Garry’s and Haslanger’s metaphors suggest not just a collection of inseparable identity 
categories, but a mixing or intermingling of them, such that the intersectional category is 
metaphysically different than the identity constituents merely stuck together. What it is to 
be a black woman cannot be understood solely by understanding what it is like to be 
black and to be a woman.  
 Which metaphor one uses might seem to be of little consequence philosophically: 
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if the concept is to be understood in such a way, why split hairs over the best abstract 
comparison?8 As I shall show in the following sections, each metaphor yields 
metaphysical commitments that can serve as a guide to a more rigorous understanding of 
interconnected aspects of social and cultural identity.  
 Let us call multidimensional identity categories like “black woman” 
intersectional categories. And call their constituents like “black” and “woman” identity 
constituents. Several questions arise. What, precisely, is the relationship of inseparability 
between identity constituents? What is the relationship between intersectional categories 
and their identity constituents? What are the persistence and modal conditions of 
intersectional categories? I turn now to these questions. 
 
2. The Metaphysics of Intersectionality 
 Social categories can be fruitfully understand in terms of determinables and their 
determinates. The determinable/ determinate relationship is a special hierarchical 
relationship of descending specificity that holds between general categories and their 
more specific instances. Scarlet is a determinate of the determinable red and circular is a 
determinate of the determinable shaped. Some determinables are inseparable while their 
determinates are separable: it is impossible to have a color without having a shape, but it 
is possible to be red without being circular. Similarly, it is impossible to have a gender 
without having a race, and impossible to have a race without having a social class. But it 
is possible to be a woman without being black.9 Thus social determinables such as 
gender, race, and class are inseparable while their social determinates such as 
womanhood, blackness, and middle-class membership are not.  
 As a concept, however, intersectionality is a claim about the inseparability of 
social determinates, not social determinables. Intersectionality is not just about belonging 
to any gender and any race; it is about belonging to a specific gender (for example, 
womanhood) and belonging to a specific race (for example, being black), and the way 
those determinate identity constituents interact with each other. But what, exactly, is this 
relationship of inseparability?  
 First, what inseparability is not. It is not conceptual inseparability, since one can 
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certainly conceive of one identity constituent without the other. Conceptually coherent 
reasoning about swapping gender, biological sex, and race identity is common and 
unmysterious. Such reasoning often replaces one identity constituent with another while 
holding other constituents fixed. One might think “If I hadn’t been a woman…” or “If I 
hadn’t been black…” even if one is a black woman. Identity categories are conceptually 
separable, in principle and in practice. 
 The sort of inseparability at stake in intersectionality cannot be modal 
inseparability, since clearly it is possible for one to be a woman without being black, and 
vice versa. Further, people can acquire and lose some identity constituents: they can 
change gender identity, religion, and socioeconomic class over the course of a lifetime in 
ways that effect dimensions of oppression and privilege.10  
 Another reason to deny modal inseparability of social categories is that existing 
metaphysical models of gender and race take the features of each to be modally 
contingent. Social race realists, for example, hold that the existence and nature of race 
depends on a network of social attitudes and relations.11 If social relations and attitudes 
determine what it is to be black, it follows that such a nature could have been very 
different than it is, since networks of social attitudes and relations could have been very 
different than they are. It should go without saying that race-defining social attitudes and 
relations do shift across time and across geography. (“I became black in America”, 
Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie memorably claimed.12) If the features of 
race and gender are contingent, they cannot be modally inseparable, since presumably the 
modal connection would depend on their natures. 
 Mereological inseparability is also unhelpful: being black and being a woman 
don’t overlap in the way that a bicycle overlaps its physical parts. Identity categories are 
not physical parts, like Legos or construction beams. Nor is the relationship between 
identity categories appropriately described as physical contact between social categories.  
 To make progress on the nature of inseparability, we can fruitfully draw on results 
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  See Silvermint (2018) and Tuvel (2017) for discussions of such cases. 
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  Haslanger’s social race realism is formulated thus: “A group is racialized (in context C) if and only if (by 
definition) its members are (or would be) socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some 
dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) (in C), and the group is “marked” as a target for this 
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain 
geographical region” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 308). 
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  “The Intolerant Left”, The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/11/the-
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from debates about the nature of diachronic composition. Diachronic composition is the 
relationship that a group of parts bears to a particular whole that it composes across time. 
Consider a pile of beams and parts in January that are gradually put together in such a 
way that they form a house in May. This relationship is one of composition, but not the 
type according to which parts compose a particular thing at a particular time. Rather, the 
house is composed across time, gradually built out of its parts.  
 Bennett (2011) draws a distinction between diachronic composition in which 
ingredients are destroyed or annihilated in the making of the object, and diachronic 
composition in which the ingredients are left intact. For example, in baking a cake, eggs 
are destroyed, but are considered constituents of the ultimate product. We can ask a 
similar question of identity constituents: to what extent are the categories black and 
woman left intact when combined into an intersectional identity like black woman?13  
 Here the intersectionality theorist must clarify her claim. There are two ways to 
go. One way is to hold that the categories black and woman do not survive the 
combination into the intersectional category, comparable to eggs being destroyed in 
service of baking the cake. Call this the destruction conception of inseparability.14 The 
other way is to hold that both categories stay intact, like the beams that eventually 
compose a house. Call this the intact category conception of inseparability. Both 
approaches have their challenges.  
  The first and biggest problem with the destruction conception is that we do not 
want to say that black women are neither black nor women. Indeed, a commitment to the 
intactness and integrity of individual identity constituents seems essential to the spirit of 
intersectional theorizing and feminist theorizing more generally, both of which seek to 
quantitatively and qualitatively expand rather than contract explanations of oppression 
and privilege.15 Maintaining the conceptual and metaphysical integrity of the identity 
constituents is a desideratum of a theory of intersectionality.  
 A second, related problem with the destruction conception is that the category 
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  Coincidentally, Lugones (2003, p. 122) also appeals to the metaphor of baking, writing: “if mayonnaise 
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toward oil or toward water […] you are left with yolky oil and oily yolk”. 
14	  This is presumably what is meant by Lugones (2007, pp. 192-193), when she writes “It is only when we 
perceive gender and race as intermeshed or fused that we actually see women of color.” 
15	  Indeed Garry (2011, p. 830) writes that intersectionality “does not abolish identity categories; instead 
they become more complex, messy, and fluid.”  
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black woman is not so distinctive as to retain no components of blackness or 
womanhood. Sorts of oppression faced by black women sometimes are explicable in 
terms of womanhood and in terms of blackness, at least partially. It’s not as if the 
individual constituents never have anything to do with it at all. Intersectional categories 
clearly share many properties and causal powers of their constituents. For example, 
writing of being stopped and interrogated on her way into a fancy hotel in her hometown, 
Adichie writes: 
 “…the automatic assumption is that a Nigerian female walking into a hotel alone 
 is a sex worker. Because a Nigerian female alone cannot possibly be a guest 
 paying for her own room. A man who walks into the same hotel is not harassed. 
 The assumption is that he is there for something legitimate.” (2012, p. 19) 
 
Even if we attribute Adichie’s treatment to her membership in the intersectional category 
Nigerian woman, it seems clear that it is still at least partially explicable in terms of her 
being Nigerian and being a woman. Adichie’s membership in these intact individual 
categories play distinctive, though overlapping, causal roles in the incident. The 
destruction conception does not allow for such causal roles, since the individual 
categories are destroyed by belonging to the intersectional category. 
 The third problem with the destruction conception is that it can be construed as 
counterproductive for theorizing about oppression, which requires unifying explanations. 
We want to be able to talk about forms of oppression and privilege shared by many 
women, not just talk about maximally specific forms of oppression and privilege.16 Citing 
a complex intersectional category such as “black disabled straight unemployed middle 
class woman born in 1956” is helpful for assessing the very specific kinds of oppression 
faced by such a person. But theorizing exclusively about the finest-grained intersectional 
categories without regard to their individual constituents is not as explanatorily fruitful as 
revealing the unifying features of social categories. We seek to determine the sorts of 
obstacles that all women face in virtue of determining the sorts of obstacles that black 
women face and Jewish women face, not only the obstacles that are specific to Jewish 
women and black women. Maintaining intact identity categories best respects the letter 
and spirit of intersectional theorizing. For methodological and first-order philosophical 
reasons, then, the destruction conception is a non-starter. 
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  Zack (2005) argues that the intersectional approach contributes to political fragmentation of feminist 
discourse. 
	   9	  
 Consider the intact category approach, which holds that identity constituents 
survive when combined into an intersectional category. For example, blackness and 
womanhood retain their properties while subsumed under the intersectional category 
black woman. This approach avoids the problem of destruction of the properties of 
individual identity constituents, but incurs other ontological and explanatory burdens. 
 First, the friend of the intact approach must accept widespread explanatory and 
causal overdetermination of intersectional categories by their identity constituents. In the 
above example, Adichie’s harassment at the hotel entrance is caused not only by her 
being a Nigerian woman, but also by her being Nigerian and being a woman. Every 
causal outcropping of membership in an intersectional category will have multiple multi-
level causes and explanations. Some causes and explanations will overlap and some will 
not, but in many cases, there will be causal and explanatory redundancy. As in the 
traditional setup of the causal exclusion problem, the alternatives to accepting widespread 
overdetermination are unappealing. One does not want to eliminate the causal and 
explanatory power of the identity constituents, for blackness and womanhood still have 
unique causal and explanatory roles. Eliminating the causal and explanatory role of the 
intersectional category goes against the very spirit of intersectional theorizing: the entire 
point is that the finer-grained category has special, distinctive causal and explanatory 
powers. Widespread overdetermination need not be considered problematic17, but it does 
multiply ontological posits of the theory. 
 Another way the intact category theorist multiplies entities is that she must accept 
a profusion of descending identity categories. On some analyses, “woman” is not a 
metaphysically fundamental category. It is divisible into further parts such as 
performative and relational aspects of womanhood, each of which themselves contain 
more specific aspects. This ontological extravagance isn’t intrinsically problematic, but it 
does add an extra layer of causal and explanatory overdetermination.   
 The primary burden of the intact category approach is to explain how the 
intersectional category is metaphysically different than the combination of its 
constituents. Here the intersectional theorist must strike a difficult balance. As discussed 
above, she must not erase or degrade the individual identity constituents that make up a 
complex, multi-dimensional identity. Muslim women, for example, are not to be seen as 
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  See Bernstein (2016) for a discussion of what makes overdetermination problematic.	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non-Muslim or non-women because they belong to the intersectional category. On the 
other hand, the friend of intersectionality must give an account of intersectional 
categories according to which the categories contribute something extra to the world, 
ontologically speaking. If talking about intersectional categories is just another way of 
talking about the constituents added together, intersectionality theory is vulnerable to a 
charge of triviality.  
 I turn now to this challenge. How might the intersectionality theorist construct a 
metaphysically substantive conception of inseparability that respects the desideratum of 
intactness of identity constituents? I propose that there are at least two ways to formulate 
inseparability, one weak and one strong.  
 The first option weakens inseparability so that it is mere interaction between 
identity categories. Often, the type of interplay between different identity constituents 
under discussion in the literature requires only this sort of minimal relationship. What the 
intersectionality theorist would posit, then, is that properties of identity constituents 
causally and metaphysically interact but that they are separable in principle and in 
practice. When being black intersects with being Muslim, for example, these two identity 
features causally interact in order to form a distinctive intersectional identity, but they do 
not inextricably interconnect. Inseparability-as-interaction also explains the Adichie 
example above: she is harassed at the hotel entrance because her blackness and her 
womanhood interact, but not because they are inextricably and irreducibly linked.18 
Inseparability as interaction respects the spirit of intersectionality theory without a 
stronger metaphysical commitment than necessary. 
 Given that many intersectional views are committed to cross-constitution of social 
categories, however, the mere interaction view is weaker than many intersectionality 
theorists would accept. Some theories posit that social categories literally build each 
other. Characterizing Lugones’ position, for example, Garry writes: 
 “Systems of oppression, namely, colonial/modern power and the colonial/ modern 
 gender system (along with heterosexualism, racial classification/ oppression, and 
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  This sort of relationship seems particularly suited for capturing the relationship between disability status 
and gender. A common complaint among those are visibly disabled is that they are not viewed as 
appropriate objects of sexual attraction. Dennis Whitcomb (private correspondence) notes that this idea is 
very similar to organic unity. 
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 capitalism), literally constitute each other and cannot be understood apart from 
 each other.” (p. 2011) (Emphasis added) 
 
Of her own view, Garry writes: 
 
 “I say that gender oppression works through and is shaped by racism, classism, 
 or heterosexualism. Mutual construction seems to be a good way to state their 
 relations in many circumstances.” (ibid, emphasis added) 
The weak formulation of inseparability as mere interaction would exclude many 
intersectional theories from the label. For obvious reasons, this is not a desirable result. 
 A second, stronger option is to view inseparability as a kind of explanatory unity 
of the intersectional category. Explanatory unity, roughly, is the explanatory 
inextricability of one category from another within an intersectional category. On this 
view, not only is a unified entity more explanatorily powerful than its constituents, but 
the unity is required to garner the correct explanations. Explanatory unity captures the 
central thrust of intersectionality—that social categories intermingle in meaningful, 
important ways—while avoiding the problems of conceptual inseparability, modal 
inseparability, and social category interaction. To some extent, the literature already 
treats intersectional categories as internally explanatorily unified. The best explanation of 
norms governing hair on black women, for example, stems from norms governing the 
behavior and appearance of black women as a single, unified category. This also holds 
true for social phenomena such as black toxic masculinity, Jewish womanhood, and white 
cisgenderhood, all of which are more suited to explanation-backing as unities than their 
individual constituents stuck together. As I will argue shortly, explanatory unity also 
comports with a systematic metaphysics of intersectionality. 
 Before turning to this topic in detail, a recap will be helpful. I began by examining 
the nature of the inseparability of social categories, the claim at the heart of 
intersectionality. This sort of inseparability, I claimed, cannot be modal or conceptual. I 
proposed two competing pictures of the relationship between social categories: a 
destruction conception, according to which constituent social categories do not survive 
their subsumption into intersectional categories; and the intact category conception, 
according to which social categories remain intact while subsumed into intersectional 
categories. I further proposed two different ways to understand inseparability under the 
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intact category conception. One way weakens inseparability to mere interaction. The 
other way views inseparability as a kind of explanatory unity. The latter, I will now 
claim, meshes well with a more general view of intersectionality as explanatory priority.  
 
3. Intersectionality as Metaphysical and Explanatory Priority of the Whole over the Parts 
 
 Thus far, I have largely focused on the relationship between social categories 
subsumed under intersectional categories, or what might be thought of as the same-level 
relationship between social categories. I turn now to a different issue: what is the 
metaphysical nature of the interlevel relationship between constituting categories and the 
intersectional categories that they make up? For example, what is the relationship 
between the individual categories black and woman and the intersectional category black 
woman?    
 My positive answer to this question has two parts. First, I hold that 
intersectionality can be fruitfully understood as a kind of ontological priority of the 
intersectional whole over the parts.19 This view is akin to Schafferian priority monism 
about categories, according to which the whole is metaphysically prior to its parts.20 The 
framework of metaphysical priority is particularly well suited to the idea that the 
conjunction of same-level social categories are more than mere aggregates. On the idea of 
the priority of the whole over its parts, Schaffer (2010) writes:  
 
 “I think common sense distinguishes mere aggregates from integrated wholes […] 
 Common sense probably does endorse the priority of the parts in cases of mere 
 aggregation, such as with the heap. Yet common sense probably endorses the 
 priority of the whole in cases of integrated wholes […] Thus consider the circle 
 and its semicircles (or even more gerrymandered divisions of the circle). 
 Intuitively, the circle seems prior—the semicircles represent an arbitrary 
 partition on the circle.” (2010, p. 11) 
 
Viewing the intersectional category as more fundamental than its constituents does 
justice to the idea that intersectional categories are more than mere aggregates, without 
resorting to the metaphysical unclarity and internal instability of other sorts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Note that this is slightly different than more general forms of social construction. For a recent account of 
social construction, see	  Díaz-León (2015). 
20	  Indeed Schaffer (2017) himself views social construction as a kind of grounding. 
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“something over and above” ontologies, including nonreductionism and emergentism.21  
 Second, intersectional categories are explanatorily prior to their constituents.  
As a first pass, A is explanatorily prior to B if B is partially explained in terms of A, but 
not vice versa. To draw on an example from mereology: parts are often viewed as 
explanatorily prior to the wholes that they compose. The direction of explanatory priority 
is often seen to run from makers to makees, lower-level things to higher-level things, and 
finer-grained to coarser-grained features. The parts of the bike explain the bike; the 
micro-level objects explain the macro-level objects; the property being a scarlet ball 
explains being a red ball. Relevant for the present discussion is that conjuncts are most 
often viewed as explaining their conjunctions: the fact that I am tall and the fact that I am 
curly-haired explain the fact that I am a tall, curly-haired person.  
 My central claim is the opposite: intersectional categories are explanatorily prior 
to their constituents. Rather than the conjuncts explaining the conjunction, the 
conjunction explains the conjuncts. The intuitive idea is that in understanding black 
womanhood, we thereby understand blackness and womanhood. Being a black woman 
explains being black and being a woman; features of blackness and womanhood are at 
least partially explained by black womanhood. Intersectional explanations are more 
informative than explanations exclusively involving the individual identity constituents. 
 The view seems counterintuitive at first: shouldn’t it be the other way around? 
There is a temptation to explain black womanhood by explaining blackness and 
womanhood, not vice versa. 
 But granting metaphysical and explanatory primacy to the unified category 
provides the best metaphysical model of intersectionality. A central tenet of intersectional 
theorizing is that blackness and womanhood mix and interact in such a way that one or 
the other or both separately do not exhaust the explanatory space of black womanhood. 
Membership in the intersectional category results in specific experiences and forms of 
oppression distinct from those faced by individual categories. 
 Further, individual identity constituents can be better understood by appealing to 
the intersectional category.22 Racist norms surrounding black women’s hair, for example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For a view of intersectionality as emergent, see Marta Jorba and Maria Rodó de Zárate (forthcoming). 
22	  Taking intersectional categories to be the most fundamental gives rise to a natural objection: are the most 
specific categories always the most explanatory ones? For example, is the social category disabled lesbian 
black woman necessarily more explanatory than a coarser grained social category? Not necessarily. 
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provide information about social norms for blacks and for women. Issues surrounding 
norms of behavior for Hispanic gay couples looking to adopt currently reflect prevailing 
heteronormative values and white values. Issues surrounding the wearing of the hijab by 
Muslim women reflect norms about women and about Muslims. Intersectional categories 
are mirrors of their constituents. 
 Viewing intersectionality as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the 
intersectional category over its parts has several additional virtues. First, such a view 
comports with meaning and usage of social categories in real intersectional communities. 
The term “misogynoir”, coined by Moya Bailey to describe specific kinds of misogyny 
aimed at black women in popular culture, illustrates the explanatory priority of black 
womanhood over blackness and womanhood. On coining the term, Bailey explains: 
 
 “I was looking for precise language to describe why Renisha McBride would be 
 shot in the face, or why the Onion would think it’s okay to talk about Quvenzhané 
 the way they did, or the hypervisibilty of black women on reality TV, the arrest 
 of Shanesha Taylor, the incarceration of CeCe, Laverne and Lupita being left off 
 the TIME list, the continued legal actions against Marissa Alexander, the twitter 
 dragging of black women with hateful hashtags and supposedly funny instagram 
 images as well as how black women are talked about in music. All these things 
 bring to mind misogynoir and not general misogyny directed at women of 
 color more broadly.” (Bailey, 2014) (emphasis added)  
 
The idea here is that there is a very specific kind of racialized misogyny leveled at black 
women in popular culture distinct even from racialized misogyny more generally. A 
derivative term transmisogynoir, the particular sort of oppression aimed at trans black 
women, originates in “misogynoir”.23 Other examples abound. Of trans women, Bettcher 
(2013) writes: 
 “It is a fact that in some trans community contexts, the meanings of gender terms 
 (such as “woman”) are altered and their extensions broadened […] “Trans 
 woman” is taken as a basic expression, not as a qualification of the dominant 
 meaning of “woman”. […] When I say that “trans woman” is basic I mean that it 
 does not route  through the question of whether “woman” applies or not; that is, 
 the criteria for  the correct application of “trans woman” do not depend on the 
 criteria governing the application of “woman”.” (2013, pp. 240-241) (emphasis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Increase in a social category’s specificity does not always correspond to an increase in explanatory power. 
As I see it, certain “social category magnets”—joint-carving social categories akin to reference magnets—
are the most explanatory, whether or not they are the most fine-grained. Intersectional categories often, but 
do not always, carve at the joints. 
23	  Following Manne (2017), I take misogyny to refer to the "enforcement wing" of patriarchal oppression, 
and misogynoir to refer to the enforcement wing of racialized sexist oppression. 
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 added) 
 
In trans communities, “trans woman” is often viewed as a metaphysically basic category 
rather than a modification of womanhood. Finally, the prominent black lesbian writer 
Audre Lorde explains the necessity of viewing her identity as a holistic, explanatorily 
fundamental whole rather than separable parts: 
 “As a black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredients of 
 my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual freedom from 
 oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect 
 of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other 
 parts of self. But this a destructive and fragmenting way to live. My fullest 
 concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate all the parts 
 of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to 
 flow back and forth freely through all of my different selves, without the 
 restrictions of externally imposed definition. Only then can I bring myself and my 
 energies as a whole to the service of those struggles which I embrace as a part of 
 my living. (2007, p. 121) (emphasis added) 
 
And finally, feminist writer Gloria Anzaldúa conceives of an integrated whole, split only 
by labels: 
 
 “Think of me as Shiva, a many-armed and legged body with one foot on brown 
 soil, one on white, one in straight society, one in the gay world, the man’s world, 
 the women’s, one limb in the literary world, another in the working class, the 
 socialist, and the occult worlds. A sort of spider woman hanging by one thin 
 strand of web. Who, me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split 
 me.” (1983, p. 205) (emphasis added) 
 
These and similar examples suggest that the metaphysical frame of explanatory priority 
does justice to real-life uses of intersectionality. 
 Intersectionality as explanatory priority permits neutrality on the comparative 
fundamentality of identity constituents. Academic sociology, psychology, and gender 
studies have seen decades-long debates over whether race, sex, gender, or class are more 
fundamental than each other.24 Some sociologists, for example, view race as being the 
most fundamental predictor of socioeceonomic class, and thus more fundamental than 
biological sex or gender.25 Others view sex and gender as being more fundamental to 
human experience than race. Still others hold that socioeconomic class is the most 
explanatorily and narratively powerful feature of human lives. A benefit of taking the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Dotson (2016) argues against the fundamentality assumption on methodological and practical grounds.	  
25	  For example, see Wilkinson (1995). 
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intersectional category to be the most fundamental is that one need not view one identity 
constituent as more fundamental than the other: the best explanation is the unified 
category rather than its constituents. Such a view has theoretical virtues not only as a 
philosophical position, but also as an intellectual and empirical approach to social 
categories more generally. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 This paper has offered a metaphysical theory of intersectionality, paying special 
attention to the contours and uses of the concept in the prevailing literature. 
Understanding interlevel and intralevel metaphysical relationships between social 
categories sheds new light on lived experiences of those who fall into multiple minority 
social categories. Modelling intersectionality with metaphysics enriches our 
understanding of the phenomenon, and of the metaphysics and explanation of 
interlocking systems of oppression more broadly. While I hope to have convinced the 
reader of the strength of my particular position, I hope even more to have laid the 
groundwork for a metaphysical approach more generally. 
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